Cryptographic key split combiner

ABSTRACT

A cryptographic key split combiner, which includes a number of key split generators for generating cryptographic key splits and a key split randomizer for randomizing the cryptographic key splits to produce a cryptographic key, and a process for forming cryptographic keys. Each of the key split generators generates key splits from seed data. The key split generators may include a random split generator for generating a random key split based on reference data. Other key split generators may include a token split generator for generating a token key split based on label data, a console split generator for generating a console key split based on maintenance data, and a biometric split generator for generating a biometric key split based on biometric data. All splits may further be based on static data, which may be updated, for example by modifying a prime number divisor of the static data. The label data may be read from a storage medium, and may include user authorization data. The resulting cryptographic key may be, for example, a stream of symbols, at least one symbol block, or a key matrix.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to cryptographic systems. In particular,the present invention relates to a system for formulating cryptographickeys used to encrypt plaintext messages and decrypt ciphertextcommunications.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

In the modern world, communications are passed between parties in avariety of different ways utilizing many different communications media.Electronic communication is becoming increasingly popular as anefficient manner of transferring information, and electronic mail inparticular is proliferating due to the immediacy of the medium.

Unfortunately, drawbacks accompany the benefits provided by electroniccommunication, particularly in the area of privacy. Electroniccommunications may be intercepted by unintended recipients. Wirelesstransmissions, such as voice communication by cellular telephone, andelectronic mail are especially susceptible to such interception.

The problem of electronic communication privacy has been addressed, andsolutions to the problem have been put in place. One form of solutionuses cryptography to provide privacy for electronic communication.Cryptography involves the encrypting or encoding of a transmitted orstored message, followed by the decryption or decoding of a received orretrieved message. The message usually takes the form of a digitalsignal, or a digitized analog signal. If the communication isintercepted during transmission or is extracted from storage by anunauthorized entity, the message is worthless to the interloper, whodoes not possess the means to decrypt the encrypted message.

In a system utilizing cryptography, the encrypting side of thecommunication incorporates an encoding device or encrypting engine. Theencoding device accepts the plaintext (unencrypted) message and acryptographic key, and encrypts the plaintext message with the keyaccording to an encrypt relation that is predetermined for the plaintextcommunication and the key. That is, the message is manipulated with thekey in a predetermined manner set forth by the text/key relation toproduce a ciphertext (encrypted) message.

Likewise, the decrypting side of the communication incorporates adecoding device or decrypting engine. The decoding device accepts theciphertext message and a cryptographic key, and decrypts the ciphertextmessage with the key according to a decrypt relation that ispredetermined for the ciphertext message and the key. That is, themessage is manipulated with the key in a predetermined manner set forthby the text/key relation to produce a new plaintext message thatcorresponds with the original plaintext message.

The manner in which the key and the relation are applied in thecommunication process, and the manner in which keys are managed, definea cryptographic scheme. There are many conventional cryptographicschemes in use today. For example, probably the most popular of these isa public-key cryptographic scheme. According to a scheme of this type,the keys used are actually combinations of a public key component thatis available to anyone or to a large group of entities, and a privatekey component that is specific to the particular communication.

An important consideration in determining whether a particularcryptographic scheme is adequate for the application is the degree ofdifficulty necessary to defeat the cryptography, that is, the amount ofeffort required for an unauthorized person to decrypt the encryptedmessage. One way to improve the security of the cryptographic scheme isto minimize the likelihood that a valid key can be stolen, calculated,or discovered. The more difficult it is for an unauthorized person toobtain a valid key, the more secure communications will be under aparticular scheme.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is therefore an object of the present invention to provide a processand apparatus for assembling keys which provides added security againstcompromising a communication by unauthorized entities.

It is a further object of the present invention to provide a process andapparatus for developing key components that cannot be reproduced byunauthorized parties.

These and other objects and advantages are provided by a cryptographickey split combiner, which includes a number of key split generators forgenerating cryptographic key splits and a key split randomizer forrandomizing the cryptographic key splits to produce a cryptographic key.Each of the key split generators generates key splits from seed data.

In one embodiment of the present invention, the key split generatorsinclude a random split generator for generating a random key split basedon reference data. The random split generator may generate a randomsequence based on the reference data, or may generate a pseudorandomsequence based on the reference data. The random key split may furtherbe based on chronological data. The random key split may instead bebased on the reference data and on static data, which may be updated.One manner of updating the static data is by modifying a prime numberdivisor of the static data.

Other key split generators may include, for example, a token splitgenerator for generating a token key split based on label data and/ororganization data and/or static data; a console split generator forgenerating a console key split based on maintenance data, whetherprevious or current, and/or on static data; and a biometric splitgenerator for generating a biometric key split based on biometric data,which may include biometric data vectors and on biometric combiner data,and/or static data. The label data may be read from a storage medium,and may include user authorization data. The resulting cryptographic keymay be, for example, a stream of symbols, at least one symbol block, ora key matrix.

The present invention also includes a process for forming cryptographickeys, which includes generating a plurality of cryptographic key splitsfrom seed data and randomizing the cryptographic key splits to produce acryptographic key. The cryptographic key splits may include, forexample, a random key split based on reference data, a token key splitbased on label data, a console key split based on maintenance data, anda biometric key split based on biometric data. These key splits may berandom sequences or pseudorandom sequences.

Generating the random key split may include generating a key split basedon the reference data and on chronological data, or based on thereference data and on static data. Generating the token key split mayinclude generating a key split based on the label data, which may beread from a storage medium and may include authorization data, and onorganization data, or based on the label data and on static data.Generating the console key split may include generating a key splitbased on previous maintenance data and on current maintenance data, orbased on the maintenance data and on static data. Generating thebiometric key split may include generating a key split based onbiometric data vectors and on biometric combiner data, or based on thebiometric data and on static data.

The static data provided for any of the key splits may be updated.Updating the static data may include modifying a prime number divisor ofthe static data.

The resulting cryptographic key may be a stream of symbols, at least onesymbol block, or a key matrix.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention will be more completely understood by way of thefollowing detailed description, with reference to the followingdrawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a communications event featuringcryptography.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a key split combiner.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Referring to FIG. 1, a communication has an origination space 2 and adestination space 4. The origination space 2 defines the place and timeat which the communication originates. The destination space 4 definesthe place and time at which the communication is intended to be decoded.The origination space 2 and the destination space 4 may be remote inlocation. Alternatively, they may be collocated but displaced in time.The space and time correspondence between the origination space 2 andthe destination space 4 depends on the nature of a particularcommunication. The origination space 2 and destination space 4 arecoupled to a common communications channel 6. This communicationschannel 6 may bridge a physical space, such as empty air in the case ofa cellular voice telephone call. Alternatively, the communicationschannel 6 may be temporary storage for the communication while timepasses between the origination space 2 and the destination space 4, suchas a message Is left in memory on a computer by a first user, for asecond user to read at a later time on the same computer. Thecommunications channel 6 may also be a combination of the two, such astelephone cables and storage memory in the case of an electronic mailtransmission.

At the origination space 2, the original plaintext message 8 is receivedand encrypted according to the encrypt text/key relation 14, using aprovided encrypt key 10, to create a ciphertext message 16. Theciphertext message 16 is received at the destination space 4 via thecommunications channel 6. An authorized entity having a proper decryptkey 20 can then provide the decrypt key 20 to the destination space 4,where it is applied to the ciphertext message 16 according to a decrypttext/key relation 22 to create a new plaintext message 24 whichcorresponds to the original plaintext message 8.

The origination space 2 and the destination space 4 can be, for example,computers, or even the same computer. An exemplary computer may have acertain amount of storage space in the form of memory for storing thetext/key relation. A microprocessor or similar controller, along with acontrol structure and random access memory for storing originalplaintext and keys provided by a user, can be included in each space andcan perform the functions of the encryption/decryption engine. An inputdevice 26, 28, such as a keyboard, floppy disk drive, CD-ROM drive, orbiometrics reader, can also be provided for accepting the key andplaintext message from the origination user, and the key from thedestination user. At the destination space 4, an output device 30, suchas a monitor, disk drive, or audio speaker, may also be provided topresent the new plaintext message to the destination user. The text/keyrelation can be stored on a floppy disk or other permanent or temporaryportable storage, rather than in hard storage in the computer, to allowdifferent text/key relations to be applied by different users or indifferent situations.

The keys that are provided at the origination space and at thedestination space may be composed of several components, or splits, eachof which may be provided by a different source. As shown in FIG. 2, arandom key split 32 may be randomly or pseudorandomly generated. Asecond split 34 may be stored on a token. A third split 36 may be storedon a console, and a fourth split 38 may be provided by a biometricsource. The key splits may be combined to form a complete cryptographickey. This key may take the form of a stream of symbols, a group ofsymbol blocks, an N-dimensional key matrix, or any other form usable bythe particular encryption scheme.

The random split 32 provides a random component to the cryptographickey. This split 32 is randomly or pseudorandomly generated based on aseed which is provided by any source as reference data 40. For example,when a user attempts to log on to a system, the date and time of theuser's log-on attempt, represented in digital form, can be used as aseed to generate the key split. That is, the seed may be provided to apseudorandom sequence generator or other randomizer to produce therandom split. Such pseudorandom sequence generators are well known inthe art. For example, a simple hardware implementation could include ashift register, with various outputs of the register XORed and theresult fed back to the input of the register. Alternatively, the seedmay be combined, or randomized, with a built-in component 42, such as afixed key seed stored at the origination space. The randomization may beperformed, for example, by applying a variation of the text/key relationto the generated seed and the stored fixed key seed. This result may befurther randomized with, for example, a digital representation of thedate and time of the encryption 44, in order to produce the random keysplit 32.

The token split 34 may be generated in a similar fashion. In this case,the seed is provided on a token, that is, it is stored on a medium thatis possessed by the user. For example, the seed may be stored on afloppy disk that the system must read as part of the encryptionprocedure. The token may store a number of different seeds, or labeldata 46, each of which corresponds to a different authorization providedby the system or specified by the user. For example, one seed may beused to generate a, key split to authorize a particular user to read amessage at a particular destination space. Another key seed may be usedto generate a key split to authorize any member of a group of users toread a message at any destination space, and for one particular user toread the message and write over the message at a particular destinationspace. The label data 46 may even designate a window of time duringwhich access to the communication is valid. This seed may be randomizedwith a built-in component 48, such as a seed stored at the originationspace, which may then be further randomized with organization data 50provided to the organization to which the user belongs.

The console split 36 is derived from a changing value stored at a userspace, such as on a system console. Maintenance data, such as thechecksum taken from a defragmentation table set, may be used to producesuch changing values. For example, the current maintenance data 52 maybe randomized with particular previous maintenance data. Alternatively,all previous maintenance data 54 may be randomized with a built-incomponent 56 stored at the origination space, the results of which areXORed together and randomized with the current maintenance data 52. Therandomization result of the changing value is the console split 36.

The biometric split 38 is generated from biometric data vectors 58provided by biometric samples of the user. For example, a retinalscanner may be used to obtain a unique retinal signature from the user.This information, in digital form, will then be used to generate thebiometric split 38. This may be accomplished by, for example,randomizing a digital string corresponding to the biometric vectors 58with biometric combiner data 60, which may be a digital hash of theuser's system identification number or some other identifying data thatcan be linked to the user's physical data provided by the biometricreader. The resulting randomized data is the biometric split 38. Thebiometric split 38 provides information that is incapable of beingreproduced by anyone but the user providing the biometric data vector58.

The built-in key split components 42, 48, 56 described herein may bestatic in that they do not change based on uncontrolled parameterswithin the system. They may be updated for control purposes, however.For example, the built-in key split components 42, 48, 56 may be changedto modify the participation status of a particular user. The key splitcomponent may be changed completely to deny access to the user.Alternatively, only a single prime number divisor of the original keysplit component may be taken from the key split component as amodification, in order to preserve a legacy file. That is, the user willbe able to access versions of the file created prior to. themodification, but will not be allowed to change the file, effectivelygiving the user read-only access. Likewise, modification of the keysplit component can be effected to grant the user broader access.

Once the key splits 32, 34, 36, 38 have been generated, they may berandomized together to produce the cryptographic key 62 for thecommunication. In performing each combination to generate the completecryptographic key, a different variation of the text/key relation may beapplied. The use of a plurality of different text/key relationvariations adds to the security of the overall cryptographic scheme. Itis contemplated that key splits other than those specifically describedherein may be combined in forming the complete key 62. The total numberof,splits may also vary, and these splits may be used to build a keymatrix to add to the complexity of the system. This complete key 62should be in a form suitable for use in the particular cryptographicscheme. That is, different fields in the key may have differentfunctions in the protocol of the communication, and should be arrangedaccordingly within the key.

At the destination space, the process is reversed in order to determinewhether a user attempting to access a message has authorization, thatis, has the valid key. The key supplied by the user at the destinationspace must include information required by the labels that were used tocreate the token split at the origination space. This information mayalso take the form of a token split. Further, a biometric split may berequired as part of the destination key, in order to provide a linkbetween assigned identification data for the user and physical datacollected from the user biometrically. The token split and the biometricsplit may be combined with other splits at the destination space to formthe complete destination key.

The invention has been described using exemplary and preferredembodiments. However, the scope of the present invention is not limitedto these particular disclosed embodiments. To the contrary, the presentinvention is contemplated to encompass various modifications and similararrangements The scope of the claims, therefore, should be accorded thebroadest interpretation so as to include all such modifications andsimilar arrangements.

1-69. (canceled)
 70. In a cryptographic system associated with anorganization, a method of encrypting an object by a user, comprising:generating a cryptographic key by combining an organization splitcorresponding to the organization, a maintenance split, a random split,and at least one label split; initializing a cryptographic algorithmwith the cryptographic key; encrypting the object according to theinitialized cryptographic algorithm; adding combiner data to theencrypted object, wherein the combiner data includes reference datacorresponding to at least one of the at least one label split and thecryptographic algorithm, name data associated with the organization, atleast one of the maintenance split and a maintenance level associatedwith the maintenance split, and the random split; and storing theencrypted object with the added combiner data.
 71. The method of claim70, further comprising selecting the at least one label split from atleast one credential.
 72. The method of claim 71, wherein the selectedat least one label split is encrypted, the cryptographic key is a firstcryptographic key, and the method further comprises: deriving a secondcryptographic key from a user ID associated with the user, a passwordassociated with the user, and at least one of a unique data instance anda random value, and decrypting the selected at least one label splitwith the second cryptographic key.
 73. The method of claim 71, whereinthe at least one credential is retrieved from a memory.
 74. The methodof claim 73, wherein the memory is disposed on a smart card.
 75. Themethod of claim 71, further comprising generating a time stampcorresponding to a time at which the object was encrypted, wherein thecombiner data further includes the time stamp.
 76. The method of claim71, wherein the combiner data further includes a user ID associated withthe user.
 77. The method of claim 70, further comprising generating atime stamp representing a time at which the object was encrypted,wherein the combiner data further includes the time stamp.
 78. Themethod of claim 70, wherein the combiner data is a header record. 79.The method of claim 70, wherein the combiner data further includes oneof a digital signature and a digital certificate.
 80. The method ofclaim 70, wherein the combiner data further includes a digital signatureand a digital certificate.
 81. The method of claim 70, wherein thecryptographic key is a first cryptographic key, the method furthercomprising: generating a second cryptographic key based at least in parton the at least one label split; and encrypting the random split withthe second cryptographic key, prior to adding the combiner data to theencrypted object; wherein the random split included the combiner data isthe encrypted random split.
 82. The method of claim 70, furthercomprising before adding the combiner data to the encrypted object,encrypting at least a portion of the combiner data with a header split.83. The method of claim 82, wherein the header split is constant. 84.The method of claim 70, wherein combining the organization split, themaintenance split, the random split, and the at least one label splitincludes applying a non-linear function to the splits
 85. The method ofclaim 84, wherein the cryptographic key is a single-integercryptographic key.
 86. The method of claim 70, wherein the organizationsplit, the maintenance split, the random split, and the at least onelabel split are provided by at least one of a policy manager and acredentials manager.
 87. The method of claim 70, wherein thecryptographic algorithm is a symmetrical algorithm.
 88. The method ofclaim 70, wherein the cryptographic key is a session key.